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Abstract 
Following a multi-decade history of lethal fires in the Bangladeshi garment industry, Sato 
(2012) proposed a contract framework that encourages manufacturers to adopt measures that 
reduce loss of life. Apart from the humanitarian imperative, the manufacturer has an 
incentive to sign the contract and adopt its preventative measures because an industrial 
disaster will cancel its relationship with its global retailer and end the related profits. This 
theoretical study specifies the optimal contract that incentivizes manufacturers and reduces 
the occurrence of garment industry fires. 
JEL: D62, D82, L67 
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 1. Introduction 
The November 24, 2012, fire at a factory that produced garments for Tazreen Fashion Ltd 
in Ashulia near Dhaka, Bangladesh, killed 112 persons and was the worst among a spate of 
Bangladeshi garment factory fires.  
At least 26 died in another garment factory fire in Ashulia only two years ago. That is, 
according to the Daily Star (2010b, 2010c), the fire erupted on the seventh floor of the 11-story 
factory of the Ha-Meem Group on December 14, 2010, and four of the seven escape routes to lower 
floors for the 300 workers on the top floor were blocked. Most of the victims died after falling from 
the building, which exacerbated the panic. The Daily Star (2010a, c) reported that garment factory 
fires on a scale similar to this tragedy have occurred in Dhaka and its suburbs (Narayanganj, 
Narsingdi, Chittagong, and Ashulia), killing at least 267 persons during 1990–2010.  
 
 
Year No. of Deaths Factory 
1990 32 Saraka Garments, Dhaka 
1996 22 Lusaka Garments, Dhaka 
1997 24 Shanghai Apparels, Dhaka 
 20 Jahanara Fashion, Narayanganj 
2000 23 Macro Sweater, Dhaka 
 12 Globe Knitting, Dhaka 
2004 23 Chowdhury Knitwear, Narsingdi 
2005 23 Shan Knitting, Narayanganj 
2006 
2010 
62 
26 
KTS Garments, Chittagong 
Ha-Meem, Ashulia 
Source: The Daily Star (2010a, c) 
Table 1: Major factory fires and the number of deaths 
 
The factory at Tazreen had not implemented even rudimentary safety measures to secure 
escape routes, and the ensuing tragedy prompted a statement two days after the fire by global 
retailer Wal-Mart:  
 
The Tazreen factory was no longer authorized to produce merchandise for Walmart. A supplier 
subcontracted work to this factory without authorization and in direct violation of our policies. 
Today, we have terminated the relationship with that supplier.   
(Wal-Mart website, emphasis by author) 
 
Paul-Majumder and Begum (2000) aroused concern with preventing factory fires in the 
readymade garment industry, which has been driving economic growth in Bangladesh: 
 
Most garment factories do not have adequate fire prevention measures. The survey of 1997 
shows that in addition to other fire code violations, most of the garment factories do not have 
fire exits or fire alarms. According to the Bangladesh Fire Brigade, up to November 1997, 58 
fire accidents took place in the garment industry; 118 workers were killed, of which 90 percent 
were female workers. (Paul-Majumder and Begum (2000, p.15), emphasis by author) 
 
This concern is acknowledged in five (i, ii, vi, xi, and xii) of the 13 “recommendations” by 
Akhter et al. (2010, p.70) that were noted from the viewpoint of female workers: 
 
(i)   Sufficient widen fire exit doors and enough ventilation with proper maintenance for air 
circulation should be designed for industry building 
(ii)   Regular fire drills should be held, minimum twice in a year 
(iii)  More toilet facilities for female workers 
(iv)   Pure water supply for drinking and washing for female workers 
(v)    Fulltime medical care and first aid treatment with female doctor and highly trained 
nurses for female workers  
(vi)   Safety management training for all kinds of worker  
(vii)  Maternity leave & weekly holiday with pay for female workers 
(viii) Fixation of wages should equal and logical for male and female workers based on living 
standard  
(ix)   Management should issues appointment latter for all kinds of workers as certainty of 
their job  
(x)    Management should permit to arrange trade union by low 
(xi)   Proper exit sign and safety sign should be applied in appropriate areas of the industry  
(xii)  All the buildings of garment industries should have proper announcement system as to 
how to get out of the building  
(xiii) Management has to provide basic legal requirements to ensure a healthy industry. 
 
Sato (2012) shows that the probability of a fire can be reduced through private contracts 
between the Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BGMEA) and its 
member factories. The contracts cited in Sato (2012) can be fulfilled so long as the cost of meeting 
recommendations i, ii, vi, xi, and xii is not prohibitive. This paper aims to design an optimal 
contract that can be fulfilled while being consensual.  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the theoretical framework. Section 3 
proposes an optimal contract. Section 4 points out the implication that the contract is not public but 
private. 
 
 2. Theoretical Framework 
In the 2010 factory fire, the families of employees who died received (in addition to the 
100,000 Tk from the Ha-Meem Group) 100,000 Tk to 200,000 Tk from BGMEA, of which the 
factory is a member. In the following, the contract between BGMEA and one of its member 
factories is considered. 
Since BGMEA must compensate families of employees killed in fires, it has a financial 
inducement to take the five indicated preventative measures recommended by Akhter et al. (2010). 
However, BGMEA is said to be unable to investigate directly whether a factory has actually 
implemented preventative measures because the factory lacks investigative resources and public 
sector inspectors are corruptible. For the factory, preventative measures have a cost c  0. For 
simplicity, we assume 
 
θ = 1/(c + 1).                           (1) 
 
When it is common knowledge that BGMEA cannot monitor fire prevention measures directly, the 
factory could neglect to implement them or have no interest in doing so.  
For simplicity, we make two assumptions.  First, we assume there are two types of fires: 
small-scale fires (h > 0) and disaster-level fires involving fatalities (H > h). Second, we assume 
BGMEA can observe that both are possible after the fact. When BGMEA observes h, it can discern 
whether the factory had taken preventative measures, but in the case of H, it cannot establish 
whether the cause was the absence of preventative measures unless there is a whistle-blower. We 
assume that the probability of a whistle-blowing (p) is exogenously given.  
BGMEA offers (s,f) in the contract with the factory, where s is the compensation that 
BGMEA commits to pay. In other words, regardless of the scale of the fire, BGEMA compensates 
both personal and physical damage caused by a fire. On the other hand, f is the fine imposed by 
BGMEA on a factory when an H-scale fire was caused by the absence of preventative measures. 
 
 
 
3. Optimal contract 
If a factory takes preventative measures under this contract, there is a probability 1 − θ(c) 
that there will be no fire and probability θ(c) that its scale will be h. If there is a fire, BGMEA 
compensates the factory amount s for damages. Private cost to the factory in that case is c − θ(c) s. 
On the other hand, social cost is given by c + θ(c) h. If the compensation to bring the private cost 
in alignment with the social cost is represented as s*, then s* = −h. 
If the factory neglects preventative measures, we derive from Equation (1) that θ = 1 when 
c = 0, so there is definitely an H-scale fire. At this time, the probability is 1 − p that the factory will 
only be compensated with s. However, p denotes the probability that the factory’s failure to take 
preventative measures will be detected and the factory must pay a fine of  f  to BGMEA. The 
private cost in this case is pf − s. However, the social cost is H. Considering that s* = −h, the fine 
required to make the private cost consistent with the social cost would be f* = (H − h)/p. Therefore, 
the optimal contract is (s*, f*) = (−h, (H − h)/p). 
Next, we consider whether moral hazard can be prevented under this contract. When 
preventative measures are implemented, the private cost to the factory is c − θ(c) s*  
= c + h/(c + 1). When preventative measures are not implemented, the private cost is pf* − s* = H. 
The difference in expected cost can be expressed as 
 ΔC = c + h/(1 + c) − H.                       (2) 
 
When c < k and k =
   21 1 4
2
H H H h    
 (graph of which is shown in Figure 1), then 
 ΔC < 0, and the factory has incentive to take preventative measures. Therefore, the following 
proposition would hold. 
 
 
Figure 1: Incentive for the factory to take preventative measures. 
 
Proposition 1: When worker safety can be improved for a sufficiently small cost, the 
optimal contract can be fulfilled at (s*, f*) = (−h, (H − h)/p). 
 If the factory declines the optimal contract and implements no safety measures, formula (1) 
indicates that an H-scale fire will definitely occur. In that case, the relationship with the retailer 
will be cancelled and profits will be lost. Denoting this lost profit as g, if g > c + h/(c + 1), the 
manufacturer will lose the option to sign the contract. Therefore, it would be rational to sign the 
optimal contract and bear c. The following proposition would hold. 
 
Proposition 2: When the profit lost due to cancellation of the relationship with the retailer 
is sufficiently large, the manufacturer has greater incentive to accept the optimal contract. 
 
4. Conclusion  
Bangladesh ranks 144th of 174 countries (bottom 17%) in the Corruption Perception Index 
2012 prepared by Transparency International. From the standard of global comparisons, there is 
room for improvement, thus, if public servants would conduct safety management inspections of 
factories, then the bribery might occur. The contracted cited by Sato (2012) and in this paper is a 
private contract, so it is not incompatible with the problem of corruption that arises when public 
servants conduct safety management inspections of factories.   
In addition, under the framework of this paper, so long as the cost of safety management is 
an independent variable in reducing the probability of a fire, for arbitrarily c ∊	[0,k], the probability 
of a fire occurring can be reduced. 
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